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Science as vocation? Discipline,
profession and impressionistic
sociology
La science est-elle un métier ? Discipline, profession et sociologie impressionniste
Michel Dubois
1 “Discipline”  and “profession” are  two basic  categories  for  describing contemporary
societies.  Nowadays,  most  of  our  social  achievements  are  interpreted  as  part  of
professional frameworks. Moreover, the division of labour between professional groups
constitutes a pivotal social feature and a major source of social inequalities. Discipline,
on the other hand, is generally construed as the basis of expert knowledge on which
professional groups heavily rely. The medical profession, which has frequently been
studied by sociologists (Merton et al. 1957; Freidson 1984 [1970]), is a case in point. Seen
from  a  wider  perspective,  disciplines  constitute  a  transnational  institutional
infrastructure that tends to produce dividing lines between legitimate knowledge and
illegitimate knowledge.
2 Sociological literature on the categories of “discipline” and “profession” is abundant.1 
As suggested by the title of this article, I discuss this literature through a specific case:
science as an occupation. The reasons for this choice are, at least, twofold. First, one of
the core objectives of the sociology of science (since its inception) has obviously been to
study the many aspects of the “disciplinary regime” of knowledge production (Shinn &
Joerges  2002).  Disciplines  are  frequently  not  only  perceived  as  a  primary  frame of
reference  in  scholarship  and  science  (Heilbron  2004a),  they  are  also  construed  by
sociologists as “empirical strategic sites” (Merton & Thacray 1972; Lemaine et al. 1977;
Heilbron 2004b; Dubois 2014a, 2014b). Secondly, as F. Champy indicated (2009), one of
the  first  contributions  to  the  sociological  study  of  professions  has  been  precisely
devoted to the scientific and/or academic occupation. On the occasion of his lecture
Wissenschaft als Beruf, delivered on November 7, 1917, Max Weber, the German founder
of sociology, chose a term—“Beruf”—that means “profession” but that is also endowed
with a religious dimension as it also refers to science as a “calling” (Weber 2004 [1919]).
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3 Besides its  great intrinsic value,  Weber’s  lecture shows that it  is  difficult  to clearly
distinguish between the professional and the disciplinary dimensions of science. The
dual  structure  of  the  lecture  seems  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  a  strong
demarcation between the two categories. The first part of the lecture focuses on the
“external organization of science” (Beruf as profession) through a comparative analysis
of the scientific careers in Germany and the United States, whereas the second part is
centred on the values that are needed (Beruf as calling) to unconditionally embrace the
disciplinary organization of scientific practices: “[…] the inner vocation of science […] is
determined  in  the  first  instance  by  the  fact  that  science  has  entered  a  stage  of
specialization that has no precedent and that will continue for all time” (ibidem: 7). 
4 However, as clear as that distinction might seem at the beginning of the lecture, it is
rapidly discarded by Weber. His analysis of scientific values is recast in professional
terms: “what is the inner attitude of the scientist himself to his profession? […]” (ibid.:
12); “Science today is a profession practiced in specialist disciplines […]” (ibid.: 27). The
discipline  is  conceptualized  as  cognitive dynamics (a  growing  specialization  of
knowledge) but also as a delimited institutional  space devoted to scholars sharing the
same  professional  value(s).  And  there  are  obviously  many  good  reasons  to
retrospectively consider Weber’s lecture as a first landmark in the sociological study of
the deontology of science.
5 Although sociologists of science, almost one century later, have generally forgotten the
Weberian notion of “Beruf”, they nonetheless adopt the same impressionistic outlook
on the categories of “profession” and “discipline”. The objective of the first section of
this article is to briefly illustrate this interpretative pitfall with a few examples drawn
from the sociological literature devoted to the socialization process in science. For the
purposes of this article, I have limited my discussion to this specific literature and have
not  explored  whether  this  impressionistic  approach  is  widespread  or  not  in  the
contemporary sociology of science, or even more widely in general sociology. 
6 The second section of the article aims to address some key conceptual and definitional
elements in order to clarify the two categories and, more broadly, the nature of their
mutual  relations.  Building  on  E.  Freidson’s  (1970  [1984]),  Y.  Gingras’  (1991)  and
Stichweh’s  (1992)  general  lines  of  arguments,  I  suggest  that  “profession”  and
“discipline”  correspond  to  two  distinct  phenomena  that  should  not  be  confused
without sufficient conceptual care. In a brief conclusion, I will discuss how an already
well-documented trend in the dynamics of science and technology may have important
consequences for the balance between these two categories in the sociological analysis
of science.
 
1. Lessons from socialization studies
7 Nowadays,  scientific  research  is  “naturally”  viewed  as  a  full  time  occupation.
Approximately  seven  million  people  daily  engage  in  countless  research  and
development  (R&D)  activities  around  the  world.2 This  situation  is  of  course
dramatically different from the one observed one century ago, in the 19th century and
before.  At  that  time,  not  only  was  scientific  research  still  practiced  on  a  limited
demographical scale, but science was not the main occupation of early practitioners of
science. Historians of science have described the German origin of this transformation
(McLeeland  1991)  but also  questioned  the  illusory  simplicity  of  the  notion  of
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“professionalization” commonly used to describe this transformation (MacLeod 1972;
Porter 1978; Goldstein 1984; Broman 1995; Golinski 1998; Barton 2003).
8 Following Weber’s focus on the basic values of science, the first American sociologists
of  science  proposed  to  define  the  scientific  community  as  a  professional  group
providing several means to guarantee its ability to produce a “certified” knowledge,
among which a specialized training process (scientific education) and a code of conduct
(a normative structure of science). Merton’s 1942 classical description of the ethos of
science3 paved the way for a research programme devoted to socialization in science.
Socialization  should  be  understood  here  as  the  process  through  which  doctoral
students “internalize” the types of commitments that they need to endorse in order to
play a useful role in their future professional group. If the main contributors to this
programme  were  at  first  Merton’s  close  collaborators  (Hagstrom  1965;  Zuckerman
1978), the issue has recently been taken up again by social scientists investigating the
impact  of  “new  norms  of  science”  on  higher  education  in  the  2000s  (Delamont  &
Atkinson 2001; Campbell 2003; Weidman & Stein 2003; Golde 2005; Gardner 2007; Barnes
& Randall 2012). 
9 There are, at least, two striking features in this recent literature on the socialization
process  in  science:  first,  its  impressionistic  use  of  the  categories  of  profession and
discipline, i.e. the absence of clear conceptual elaboration for both categories; second, a
general analytical blindness to the differences between the two categories, which very
significantly weakens sociological investigation.
10 A few examples may be useful here to illustrate our criticisms of recent literature on
these issues. Delamont and Atkinson (2001) provide an interesting account of academic
socialization  based  on  interviews  with  doctoral  scientists  and  their  supervisors  in
biochemistry, earth sciences and physical geography. They recognize that the relevant
literature  on  socialization  in  science,  although  limited  in  volume,  comes  from  the
sociology and anthropology of science and technology, the sociology of the professions,
and the sociology of education. Their initial claim is undeniably stimulating: “Doctoral
students in laboratory and field sciences are being socialized into a profession and into
an academic discipline” (2001: 87). But not only is the reader incapable to find in the
following pages of the article any in-depth definitions of these two categories—which,
however, are central to the study— but the same empirical facts, practices or resources
discussed  through  the  article  (the  know-how,  the  tacit  skills  required,  etc.)  are
alternatively described in professional and disciplinary terms,4 just as though these two
categories were perfectly interchangeable.
11 Campbell’s  (2003)  contribution  on  socialization5 focuses  on  “the  social  process  of
managing students”, or, in other words, how science faculty members view and engage
in the process of preparing the future generation of scientists. The empirical material is
a series of interviews with scientists in biology, chemistry, geology and physics. Most
studies on scientific training suggest that whether scientists become successful or not
is—directly or indirectly—linked to the quality of  training they received from their
sponsors or teachers. But are they trained for science as a discipline, or science as a
profession? Campbell’s article actually mobilizes both categories—once again without
any  substantial  definitions—and  uses  them  alternatively  to  describe  the  same
phenomena.  Quoting  Barbara  Reskin’s  study  on  the  issue  of  academic  sponsorship,
Campbell  claims  that  “in  training  students,  sponsors  transmit  to  them  professional
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(italics added, MD) skills that will enhance their scientific performance and hence their
job prospects” (2003: 902). But a few pages later Campbell (ibidem: 909) notes that 
through formalized courses, scientists present their worldviews to new members,
and  provide  students  with  opportunities  for  developing  attitudes,  skills  and
knowledge, appropriate to the discipline (italics added) at hand. 
12 Gardner’s  investigation  (2007)  on  doctoral  students’  socialization  in  chemistry  and
history is a third example of literature on the socialization process in the scientific
world. Gardner’s general objective (2007: 729) is to 
understand  the  processes  of  socialization  that  occur  throughout  the  degree
programs of […] 20 graduate students in chemistry and history and that assist them
in developing  the  knowledge,  skills,  and beliefs  needed for  success  in  both  the
professional and interpersonal spheres of the discipline. 
13 If, like Delamont, Atkinson or Campbell, Gardner does not provide any clear definition,
this sentence seems to imply that the discipline should be understood as a social unit
composed  of  two  main  “spheres”:  professional  vs  interpersonal.  The  professional
sphere  of  the  discipline  refers,  according  to  Gardner,  to  the  development  and
transmission of “a set of skills […] that the students need to obtain before graduating”
(2007:  734).  These  skills  are  obviously  a  precondition  for  obtaining  a  post-doctoral
appointment  and/or  achieving  a  scientific  career.  But  Gardner’s  students,  in  their
interviews,  do  not  simply  mention  jobs  and  careers,  they  also  describe  their
socialization  in  science  as  a  process  of  “getting  into  the  research  mindset”,  which
means gradually adopting a “set of dispositions” that prepare them to appropriately fit
into their own disciplinary milieus (chemistry or history). Once again, regrettably, the
categories  of  discipline  and  profession  appear  to  be  largely  interchangeable  as
analytical categories.
14 There is no need here to multiply examples and references. The general lesson that
emerges from this brief discussion is that, before starting any empirical investigation,
the sociologist should overcome this mostly impressionistic use of the categories of
discipline and profession.
 
2. What is a discipline and why should it be
distinguished from a profession?6
15 The notion of “discipline” is commonly used to describe a specific area of specialized
knowledge associated with a specific form of collective control over its production and
diffusion.  The  sociological  inquiry  on  disciplines  is  closely  related  to  a  general
reflection  on  the  various  ways  in  which  modern  institutions  dedicated  to  the
production  and  dissemination  of  knowledge  implement  a  triple  degree  of
differentiation.
16 The first degree, at a micro level, allows to distinguish the pupil from the teacher, the
apprentice from the master.  Discipline,  in its  original  sense,  is  a  component of  the
pedagogical relationship. Disciplina is derived from the Latin discere (learning), and the
term  explicitly  focuses  on  the  knowledge  transmitted  through  the  pedagogical
relationship, but also on the methods used for inculcating this knowledge. It generally
represents the side of the student as opposed to the teacher, more inclined toward the
doctrina than  the  disciplina.  H.  Zuckerman  has  described  the  many  facets  of  the
discipline  conceived  as  a  pedagogical  relationship  (1978,  chapter  4).  Most  Nobel
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laureates  interviewed  by  Zuckerman  consider  that  acquiring  information  and
knowledge is part of any apprenticeship in science. But most of them also believe that
knowledge is only a small part of what is durably inculcated during this period through
the relationship with the master: “It’s the contact: seeing how they operate, how they
think, how they go about things […]. It’s learning a style of thinking, I guess” (from an
interview of a chemist, quoted by Zuckerman 1978: 122).
17 The second degree,  at  a meso level,  corresponds to the division of scientific  labour
within  the  corresponding  community.  The  discipline  is  a  subunit  of  knowledge
production, distinct from other sub-units of knowledge production. The contemporary
significance of the disciplinary regime of science is partly anchored in the frequently
taken-for-granted idea that the existence of these subunits implies a form of “natural”
or  “harmonious”  division  of  labour.  Innumerable  monographs  explore  the  birth,
growth and sometimes declining phases of disciplines like chemistry, physics, biology,
geology,  etc.  (see  Dubois  2014a,  for  references).  The  sum  of  all  these  subunits
constitutes a crucial dimension of the internal structure of the scientific community.
Weber’s  lecture  on  science  as  vocation  explicitly  refers  to  this  growing  internal
differentiation of science.7 It is from that same perspective that R. Stichweh (1991, 1992,
2003) or more recently J.  Jacobs (2014) defined discipline as a “key unit of  internal
differentiation in science”, i.e. a delimited set of individuals working simultaneously as
researchers  but  also  as  teachers  within  a  specific  cognitive  perimeter.  Stichweh’s
objective  is  to  reconstruct,  within  a  functional  framework  inspired  by  the  German
sociologist N. Luhmann, the long-term historical transition from discipline conceived
as a pedagogical relationship (the first degree of differentiation) to discipline conceived
as a social system of scientific labour and scientific communication (the second degree
of differentiation): 
The disciplinary differentiation of science is based on the organizational growth
and the organizational pluralization of science. In Germany, the first country to
witness disciplinary differentiation,  organizational  growth appears to have been
the more relevant causal condition. In the 18th century, the University of Göttingen
was  the  first  instance  in  which  considerable  growth  in  the  provision  of
organizational roles, in particular in the philosophy faculty, was accompanied by a
readiness  to  accept  increasingly  specialized  descriptions  of  professorial  chairs.
(Stichweh 1992: 9)
18 Finally,  at a macro level,  the discipline is  conceived as a “regime”—the disciplinary
regime (Shinn 2002)—i.e. a dominant culture of science. Claiming that a specific area of
research has acquired a disciplinary status or regime does not only mean that it has
achieved  a  form  of  (second  degree)  internal  differentiation  within  the  scientific
community.  Before that,  this  area of  research has  to  be  collectively  perceived as  a
legitimate  component  of  science.  And  this  process  of  legitimization  associates  the
notion of discipline to an external form of (third degree) differentiation. It is in that
sense that  the disciplinary regime of  science (among many other possible  regimes)
should be interpreted as a transnational infrastructure aiming to produce a boundary
between science and non-science. The sociological analysis of disciplines is most often
“differentiationist”, to the extent that it stresses the ability of scientists to produce,
through the notion of discipline, a basic discontinuity not only between their practices
and the practices of the colleagues belonging to other scientific subunits, but, more
importantly,  from the practices characteristic  of  non-scientific  social  collectives.  As
emphasized by T. Gieryn (1999: 14-15), discipline redefined as the dominant 
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cultural space of science is a vessel of authority […] [and] this epistemic authority is
sustained through repeated and endless edging and filling of its boundaries […] it is
enacted as people debate (and ultimately decide) where to locate the legitimate
jurisdiction over natural facts. 
19 The  study  of  the  socio-cognitive  origin  of  these  three  degrees  of  disciplinary
differentiation,  of  their  organisational  and  practical  implementation,  and  of  their
intentional  and  non-intentional  consequences,  is  of  course  a  major  issue  for  the
contemporary study of  science.  I  wish to  focus  on two particular  issues  that  are  a
frequent source of confusion in sociological discourse.
20 The first issue has to do with the enduring existence of disciplines and their ability to
remain a dominant culture of science, a “vessel of authority” in the words of T. Gieryn.
Why should sociologists be cautious about considering “discipline” as an empirical unit
of  investigation? Because,  according to  sociologists  of  science such as  Knorr-Cetina
(1982: 117), 
scientists' laboratory reasoning not only takes us outside the walls of the research
site, it also takes us beyond the borders of the specialty under which a scientist—or
a piece of research—comes to be classified. We are thus confronted with arenas of
action which are transepistemic; they involve a mix of persons and arguments that
do not fall naturally into a category of relationships pertaining to 'science' or 'the
specialty' […]. 
21 Concepts,  such as  that  of  discipline,  that  are  precisely  designed to account  for  the
processes of  internal  and external  differentiations,  are described as  powerless  once
confronted to 
the complex texture of knowledge as practiced in the deep social spaces of modern
institution. To bring out this texture, one needs to magnify the space of knowledge-
in-action,  rather  than  simply  observe  disciplines  or  specialties  as  organizing
structures. (Knorr-Cetina 1999: 2-3)
22 The same general point was made by Gibbons et al. in their controversial essay about
The New Production of Knowledge (1994). Their main argument (the evolution of science
from mode 1 to mode 2) is based on a striking feature of contemporary science, namely
its transdisciplinarity (1994: 22 & 27): 
The proliferation of sites outside of normal disciplinary structures and institutions
developed  since  the  turn  of  the  nineteenth  century,  in  which  recognisably
competent research is taking place, opens up a vast field of interconnections. As
interactions multiply, the epistemological status of the knowledge thus produced
does not follow traditional, that is, disciplinary criteria […] the intellectual agenda
is  not  set  within  a  particular  discipline,  nor  is  it  fixed  by  merely  juxtaposing
professional  interests  of  particular  specialists  in  some  loose  fashion  leaving  to
others  the  task  of  integration  at  a  later  stage.  Integration  is  not  provided  by
disciplinary  structures—in  that  regard  the  knowledge  process  is  not
interdisciplinary, it cuts across disciplines—but is envisaged and provided from the
outset in the context of usage or application […]. 
23 Should we really consider these observations as a death certificate for the category of
discipline? Are disciplines such as physics, biology, economics, obsolete? My scepticism
comes from the observation that the transdisciplinarity described by Gibbons et al. is
after  all  nothing  really  new.  Granted,  the  notions  of  trans-,  inter-  or  multi-
disciplinarity currently appear as attractive. As emphasized by J. Jacobs (2014: 2), as
debates  on  interdisciplinarity  have  become  more  frequent,  “the  adjective
‘interdisciplinary’ now generally has a positive valence […]. It sometimes seems that
interdisciplinarity has become an end in itself”. However, beyond this buzzword effect,
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it is worth noting that innumerable studies dedicated to the emergence, growth and
decline of disciplines and specialties have extensively documented the ways in which
scientists are innovating by standing in the interstices of the pre-existing disciplinary
framework,  or  by  operating  recombinations  from  multiple  available  specialties.
Innovation in science and technology is frequently the consequence of an interstitial
work. One example might suffice: N. Mullins’s (1972) classical study on the origins of
molecular biology shows how the emergence of a specific discipline was the product of
an  interaction  between  physicists  (Delbrück),  biologists  (Timofeeff-Rossovsky),
bacteriologists (Luria), biochemists (Cohen), etc. 
24 Mullins’s  study  demonstrates,  if  needed,  the  ability  of  scientists  to  suspend,
intellectually  and  organizationally,  pre-existing  disciplinary  boundaries  in  order  to
develop  an  innovative  research  programme.  But  does  it  also  demonstrate  the
obsolescence  of  the  disciplinary  regime?  Obviously  not.  These  interstitial  locations,
these  collaborations  and  recombinations  are  possible  precisely  because  of  the  pre-
existence of a disciplinary infrastructure. It is a truism that appears to be overlooked
by many: disciplinary infrastructure is what makes them possible. Furthermore, once
sufficiently  advanced,  it  is  not  infrequent  (although it  is  not  always  the  case)  that
emerging collective transdisciplinary scientific practices change and gradually acquire
an  institutional  status  as  a  discipline  or  a  specialty.  A  trandisciplinary  practice  of
science  does  not  necessarily  maintain  a  mutually  exclusive  relationship  with
disciplinary  infrastructure.  Rather,  it  represents  a  modality  of  innovation  and
knowledge transfer within this infrastructure, and a major cause of its evolution. The
segmentation of the disciplinary regime of science is not given once and for all, but
evolves  under  the  influence  of  various  factors,  among  which  the  transdisciplinary
practices of the members of the scientific community. There is no point in adopting an
a  priori binary  representation:  a  static  disciplinary  regime  vs a  dynamic
transdisciplinary  regime.  It  seems  much  more  relevant  to  study  the  specific
temporalities related to each of these regimes, and to investigate their various forms of
interaction and their collective consequences. Even Knorr-Cetina does not seem to be
totally convinced by her own argument since, after proclaiming the uselessness of the
category of discipline, she nevertheless claims that her own study has been “performed
in two disciplines [italics added, MD], experimental high physics and molecular biology”
(1999: 17).
25 This  type  of  inconsistency  (proclaiming  the  abandonment  of  a  category  while
continuing to use it) stresses the importance for sociologists to clearly dissociate at
least two levels of analysis. The first level may be defined in terms of “cluster” (Mullins
1972)  or  “research  area”  (Whitley  1976).  Both  terms  represent  a  minimal  form  of
scientific  grouping,  the  members  of  which  are  aware  of  forming  some  kind  of
community. For Mullins, “[a] cluster forms when scientists become self-conscious about
their patterns of communication and begin to set boundaries around those who are
working on their common problem” (1972: 69). For Whitley (1976: 472),
research areas are collectivities based on some degree of commitment to a set of
research  practices  and  techniques.  Membership  is  defined  in  terms  of  agreed
procedures  for  specifying  research  problems  and  for  selecting  appropriate
techniques to operate on them. In different areas these procedures will be more or
less clearly formulated, understood and adhered to, but so long as there is some
such set of  norms to which scientists are committed the intellectual  basis for a
research area as a social grouping exists. 
Science as vocation? Discipline, profession and impressionistic sociology
ASp, 69 | 2016
7
26 Researchers who, regardless of their different disciplinary backgrounds, share the same
commitment to a set of research questions (problems and enigmas), techniques and
practices that allow them to maintain relations of exchange and cooperation, belong to
these  elementary  scientific  groups.  This  informal  social  structure  of  science  is  an
ordinary place for the production of knowledge—one that has attracted the attention of
(micro-)sociologists of science in the 1980s. And this interstitial collective body defined
in terms of research area or cluster is in itself neither a specialty nor a discipline. 
27 Hence  the  need  to  properly  identify  a  second  level  of  analysis,  that  of  the  actual
discipline  (the  specialty  being  understood  here  as  a  disciplinary  subunit)  which
corresponds to the institutionalized form of research, teaching and training activities.
There is no simple relationship between a research area and a discipline. One is not
necessarily the cause of the other. As emphasized by Lenoir (1997: 53), 
one temptation is to treat disciplines as the accreted results of research activity,
packed down and distilled into the teaching wing of science. This has the undesired
consequence of conflating what goes on at the site of research with disciplinary
activity, which […] are not identical. Scientists at the research front do not perceive
their goal as expanding a discipline. Indeed, most novel research, particularly in
contemporary science, is not confined within the scope of a single discipline, but
draws upon work of several disciplines.
28 Lenoir focuses here clearly on the fact that a discipline integrates in a single framework
research  activities  and  teaching  activities.8 Discipline  corresponds  to  the  sum  of
knowledge produced and taught in the academic sphere, and most of the apprentices in
science  become  familiar  with  research  activities  within  the  existing  array  of
disciplinary divisions. But, more fundamentally, Lenoir stresses the fact that scientists
do  not  necessarily  have  disciplinary  objectives  and,  further,  that  not  all  scientific
groups  are  meant—or  sometimes  able—to  acquire  a  lasting  institutional  form.9
Proclaiming from this unwillingness or this inability a general thesis in support of the
so called “end of disciplines” seems at least a bit too hasty.
29 This brings me to the second point I wish to discuss, namely the analytical distinction
between “discipline” and “profession”.  A discipline is  frequently  characterized as  a
primary  unit  of  internal  differentiation  in  science,  closely  related  to  the
institutionalization of a pre-existing collective scientific practice that has multi-, inter-
or trans-disciplinary dimensions. It is generally described in terms of organizational
factors such as the existence of learned societies, funds, awards, congresses, journals,
doctoral  schools  or  teaching  departments,  formal  and  informal  networks  of
communication,  etc.  As  observed  in  the  very  case  of  the  sociology  of  science,  a
discipline  is  more  than  just  an  amount  of  shared  knowledge  and  know-how—even
though this formal and informal cognitive side is fundamental: it is at the same time a
shared narrative about the origin of a social group, a set of rituals, norms, locations, a
communication network, and it exists because it has been recognized as a discipline by
other pre-existing disciplines (Dubois 2014a). All those various factors, through which
disciplinary identity is made visible and collectively reproduced, are generally defined
as  attributes  of  scientific  “professionalization”.  Hence  the  recurring  idea  that  the
categories of “discipline” and “profession” are almost synonyms, and the fact that it is
common to refer to the “professional identity" of any discipline (Merton & Thacray
1972). The difficulty lies here in the fact that all scholarly activities do not maintain the
same relationship to the categories of “profession” and “discipline”, and that the term
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“professionalization” amalgamates various occupational realities that it is essential to
distinguish. 
30 Obviously,  in  private  as  in  public,  scientists  frequently  depict  themselves  as
“professionals” of science, i.e. individuals earning their living through the exclusive
practice of science, and building, in the long run, a “career” in a three dimensional
space—organizational, cognitive and relational (Prpic et al. 2014; Gläser & Laudel 2015).
However, beyond this rather loose usage of the term, do scientists really share a same
view of the notion of “profession”? It is useful here to note that elaborating on this
notion is closely related to a focus on a specific activity. Regardless of the numerous
theoretical backgrounds that underlay their research, the first sociologists who became
interested in “profession” as an analytical category agreed on considering medicine as a
“prototype” for all professions.10 What are the main characteristics of this prototype?
Without claiming to be exhaustive, four elements seem to play a central role. 
31 (1) Authority and Power, first, are important components of medicine as a profession. As
suggested by Parsons (1939:  460) in his classical  lecture on The professions and social
structure, 
[…] the professional practitioner in our society exercises authority. We speak of the
doctor  as  issuing ‘orders’  even though we know that  the  only  ‘penalty’  for  not
obeying them is  possible  injury to the patient's  own health.  A lawyer generally
gives ‘advice’, but if the client knew just as well what to do it would be unnecessary
for him to consult a lawyer. 
32 While being sharply critical of the Parsonian functional theoretical framework, Larson
(1977) or Abbott (1988) nonetheless considered that authority is a strategic dimension
of  any  profession.  A  professional  project  is  systematically  a  will  to  construct  a
“monopoly” and to increase, through this monopoly, occupational status and power. 
33 (2) Specialized knowledge, skills, capacities and services (and corresponding fees) are a second
important component of medicine as profession. Medicine is constructed as a specific
area of applied knowledge.11 For the physician to be considered as a professional, s/he
must find,  in the words of  Wilensky (1964:  138),  “a technical  basis  for it,  assert  an
exclusive  jurisdiction,  link  both  skill  and  jurisdiction  to  standards  of  training,  and
convince the public that its services are uniquely trustworthy”. The traditional divide
between “occupation” and “profession” heavily  relies  on the reference to a  sum of
know-how  and  technical  capacities  described  as  inaccessible  to  lay  persons.12 The
physician  enjoys  professional  authority  and  social  prestige  as  long  as  s/he  is
collectively perceived as the bearer of expert knowledge accumulated through a long
process  of  education.  In  this  respect,  Parsons  clearly  emphasized  the  centrality  of
rationality for professions, such as medicine, that are closely related to the growth of
scientific  knowledge.  In  the  same  vein,  Merton  (1957:  21)  observed  that  the  link
between medicine and the various sciences upon which medicine draws its cognitive
support imposes a specific  form of education and socialization:  “Every considerable
advance in medical knowledge […] brings in its wake the pressing question of how this
new knowledge can be most effectively taught to the student.” 
34 (3) Ethical conduct is a third important component of medicine as profession. On the
basis of his early studies on the normative structure of science, Merton had no trouble
developing  a  normative  approach  of  medicine.  To  his  eyes,  the  physician  is  a
professional as long as, like any other professional, he has internalized a set of norms,
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standards and values indicating what is  permitted and what is  proscribed,  in other
words, a set of normative principles that guarantee the possibility of self-regulation: 
[T]he physician in his private office is largely subject to the controls only of the
values and norms he has acquired and made his own. The medically uninformed
patient is not in a position to pass sound judgment upon the normative adequacy of
what the physician does. (1957: 77) 
35 This  Mertonian  discussion  brings  me  to  a  fourth  key  component  of  medicine  as
profession.
36 (4) Autonomy understood as the capacity of the community of physicians to regulate themselves
through several mechanisms. The professional order of medical doctors in France, or the
College of Physicians and Surgeons in the USA are the most obvious manifestations of
this collective self-regulation process. And these self-regulation bodies generally claim
the exclusive right to determine who is legitimate to work as a physician and who is
not.  Studying  the  medical  profession,  Freidson  (1970:  71-72)  described  “organized
autonomy” as a strategic characteristic for any profession:
a profession is distinct from other occupations in that it has been given [generally
by  the  State,  MD  added]  the  right  to  control  its  own  work.  […]  And  while  no
occupation  can  prevent  employers,  customers,  clients,  and  other  workers  from
evaluating its work, only the profession has the recognized right to declare such
“outside” evaluation illegitimate and intolerable.
37 It is however important to note that this autonomy is not given once and for all: it is
often challenged and reactivated through continuous competition and disputes with
other professional groups. Wilensky has rightly pointed out that medicine is regularly
doing battle with “marginal practitioners” such as osteopaths or chiropractors. More
recently, these professional disputes were extensively analysed by A. Abbott (1988). For
Abbott, it is not possible to understand individual professions without reconstructing
the interplay  of  the  “jurisdictional  links”  between professions.  He  uses  the  case  of
American medicine to demonstrate the complexity of such an interplay. Medicine “is
not  a  continuous  entity.  Development  activity,  and  interprofessional  relations  are
bound  together.  The  medical  professions  absolute  control  of  bodily  ills  required
defensive work in a number of borders” (Abbot 1988: 21).
38 Given the four elements that characterize medicine construed as a prototype for all
professions, why is it still important not to adopt an interchangeable approach of the
categories of “discipline” and “profession”? In my opinion, one should keep in mind at
least three basic reasons. 
39 Firstly, failing to distinguish between the categories of discipline and profession bars us
from understanding the differences in nature between the activities of biologists and
physicians, physicists and engineers, historians and lawyers, etc. A discipline (biology,
physics,  history,  etc.)  corresponds  to  an  occupation  devoted  to  the  production  of
original  and  robust  knowledge.  Its  core  defining  component  is  oriented  toward  a
cognitive  dimension.13 A  profession  (medicine,  law,  engineering)  is  an  occupation
devoted to  the  application of  available  knowledge to  human problems.  Its  defining
component  is  the service relation between the professionals  and their  clients.  This
elementary  distinction  between,  say,  biologists  and  physicians,  does  not  mean,  of
course, that they do not share some basic formal characteristics. Obviously biologists
and physicians are highly trained experts: they use specialized knowledge and skills
and contribute to producing them. They have their own specific normative subculture,
a body of shared and transmitted ideas, values and standards—for the scientist,  the
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ethos of science described by Merton. They both also have jurisdictional claims (Abbott
1988), meaning rights to control the provision of particular services and activities. But
these  common  features  should  not  obscure  the  fact  that  some  crucial  differences
remain. As emphasized by Freidson (1970: 22), there is a conceptual need to distinguish
between profession and discipline, physicians and biologists: 
The former survive by providing to a varied lay clientele services that are expected
to solve practical problems. […] The latter, however, […] can gain their monopoly
over work solely by the conjunction of […] association and state support. […] These
two types of occupation may be members of one very general class […] but the
conditions for their establishment and maintenance are so distinct that one risks
great confusion by considering them together.
40 Secondly, failing to distinguish between the categories of discipline and profession bars
us  from  adequately  describing  the  socio-historical  process  of  emergence of  the
scientific disciplines. All known modern disciplines stem from the three faculties that,
in  early  modern  Europe,  provided  a  professional  education:  theology,  law  and
medicine. However, as indicated by Stichweh (1992: 10), 
in the 19th century, scientific disciplines developed for the first time exclusively
with their own personnel and separated themselves completely from the traditions
of the three pre-existing faculties as far as their knowledge base and methodology
was concerned.  […] Actually the classical  professions,  after the turn of the 19th
century,  represented  not  scholarly  knowledge  systems  but  action  systems
specializing  in  contacts  between  members  of  the  profession  and  clients.  Their
respective knowledge bases were activated primarily for that purpose. Increasingly
they developed a dogmatic—that is, action-stabilizing—character. In contrast, the
disciplines represented closed communication complexes in which colleagues were
seen  as  the  disciplinary  audience  and  clients  were  not  known.  A  difference
developed  between  internal  closure  and  exclusive  concentration  on  elaborating
scientific truths on the one hand and reorientation toward action and application
of knowledge in the contact  between professional  and client  on the other.  This
difference is an indication of the increasing distance between scientific disciplines
and professional action systems, not of the professionalization of science.
41 Through  this  historical  narrative,  Stichweh  shows  that  the  advent  of  our  modern
disciplinary infrastructure supposes a process of “de-professionalization” that led to
assign the scientist to a “closed market”, meaning a market in which there was only
one kind of consumers: the other members of the scientific community, redefined as
both “associates” and “rivals” in the production and circulation of knowledge.
42 Lastly, failing to distinguish between the categories of discipline and profession bars us
from identifying not only the variety of regimes of scholarly activities, but also the
capacity of the members of the academic sphere to switch, during their career, between
these regimes. Against a too simplistic vision of science (mode 1 vs mode 2 or in other
words  discipline  vs  profession),  there  are  only  advantages  in  adopting a  pluralistic
approach oriented toward the analysis of the variety and the dynamics of scholarly
activities and regimes. This general perspective was developed by T. Shinn (2002: 101)
in his discussion of the transitory regime of science and technology: 
Analyses of the transitory science and technology regime maintain the idea of a
demarcation between academia (discipline) and engineering (profession), but at the
same time show how practitioners intermittently pass back and forth between the
two arenas. In studies of the transverse science and technology regime, the idea of
the institutional boundedness of science and engineering is preserved, but the focus
is  on  situations  where  back  and  forth  movement  in  unceasing.  Practitioners
structure divisions of labor in particular ways according to task requirements. 
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43 One historical  example is  enough to demonstrate the importance of  this  pluralistic
approach:  in  their  biographical  study of  William Thomson (known as  Lord Kelvin),
Smith and Wise (1989) documented how Thomson switched from mathematical physics
to engineering, and from engineering back to physics. They incidentally point out that
it is Thomson’s involvement in the grandest of all Victorian engineering projects—the
Atlantic telegraph cable—that earned him his knighthood. If  one agrees to consider
discipline and profession as two differentiated institutional arenas, one immediately
sees  the  various  amalgams  at  work  in  the  ordinary  discourse  on  the
“professionalization”  of  science.  This  discourse  contributes  to  mask  the  variety  of
identities associated to the functioning of the primary units of internal differentiation
in science: “profession” (engineers) is one of these identities, “discipline” (researchers)
is yet another. 
 
Conclusion: “asymmetrical convergence” and the
changing balance between discipline and profession
44 Recognizing  the  importance  of  the  analytical  distinction  between  “profession”  and
“discipline”  does  not  imply  that  one  should  adopt  a  static  representation  of  the
equilibrium  between  these  two  categories.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  precisely  that
distinction that makes it possible to approach certain dimensions of the contemporary
dynamics  of  science  and  technology  (henceforth  S&T);  dynamics  viewed  as  the
consequence  of  the  interaction  between  S&T  construed as  a  profession,  and  S&T
construed as a discipline. 
45 One of these dimensions was depicted by Kleinman and Vallas (2001, 2006) as a process
of “asymmetrical convergence”. In the area of biotechnology, scientists working within
the disciplinary regime are more and more compelled to respond to the constraints of
the commercial  world,  while  engineers  and research engineers  working in  science-
intensive firms find an autonomy and collegiality that are traditionally thought not to
be available in the professional realm. For Kleinman and Vallas (2006: 36–37), 
[o]n  the  one  hand,  science-intensive  firms  find  it  useful  to  invoke  academic
conventions, such as the publishing of journal articles, sponsoring of intellectual
exchanges, and supporting curiosity-driven research (though in complex and often
contradictory  ways  that  articulate  with  corporate  goals).  On  the  other  hand,
academic  institutions  increasingly  resort  to  entrepreneurial  discourses  and
practices  […].  The  result,  we  contend,  generates  contradictions,  anomalies,  and
ironies […]. 
46 This simultaneous and ironic change at work in the life sciences is obviously a key
issue. Every sociologist of science working on regenerative medicine (Brunet & Dubois
2012),  nano-medicine  (Louvel  2015)  or  epigenetics  (Landecker  &  Panofsky  2013)  is
aware  of  this  general  trend.  But  such  a  phenomenon  does  not  mean  that  the
occupational dimensions of discipline and profession have nowadays merged into one
single  dimension.  It  means mostly  that  S&T actors  have the capacity  to  transform,
through  their  strategies  and  the  corresponding  structures  of  opportunity,  the
equilibrium between the arenas of profession and discipline, and by doing so to achieve
a new collective identity. Yet, such a transformation generally corresponds to a new
temporary equilibrium, and remains partly shaped by pre-existing norms and practices
that belong to one occupational arena or the other.
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NOTES
1. The recent second edition of  the  International  Encyclopedia  of  the  Social  & Behavioral  Sciences
(Wright 2015) for example, presents no less than four entries for “discipline” and seven entries
for “profession”: Discipline-Building in the Social Sciences; Collective Memory, Biography and
Autobiography;  Development  and  Current  Status  of  the  Discipline  of  Criminology;  Discipline
Formation in the Social Sciences; Professions and Professionalization, History of; Social Science
Professions  and  Professionalization;  Lawyers:  Social  Organization  of  the  Profession;  Medical
Profession; Professions in Organizations;  Teaching as a Profession: United States;  Professions,
Sociology of.
2. For more details about the volume and distribution of these activities, see the annual science
and engineering reports from national and international organizations such as the NSF <http://
www.nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsb20161/#/report>, UNESCO  < http://www.uis.unesco.org/
ScienceTechnology/Pages/default.aspx> or OECD <http://www.oecd.org/sti/msti.htm>.
3. The sum of “prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences and permissions […] internalized by the
scientist” (Merton 1973 [1942]: 269).
4. “Successful doctoral students master the tacit, indeterminate skills and knowledge, produce
usable results and become professional scientists. As professional scientists, they learn to write
public accounts of their investigations which omit the uncertainties, contingencies and personal
craft skills” (Delamont & Atkinson 2001: 88). “Those scientists who learn to publish have been
enculturated into their discipline, leaving the next generation of doctoral students to repeat the
cycle” (ibidem: 104).
5. Socialization defined as an “all-encompassing immersion into an institutional setting, where
every aspect of one's behavior appears to be controlled by some objective and impersonal force
that is an integral part of the structure of science” (Campbell 2003: 900).
6. This second part is an extended version of the first section of Dubois (2014a).
7. “[S]cience has entered a stage of specialization that has no precedent and that will continue
for all time […]. Only rigorous specialization can give the scholar the feeling for what may be the
one and only time in his entire life, that here he has achieved something that will last. Nowadays,
a really definitive and valuable achievement is always the product of specialization. And anyone
who lacks the ability to don blinkers for once and to convince himself that the destiny of his soul
depends upon whether he is right to make precisely this conjecture and no other at this point in
his manuscript should keep well away from science” (Weber 2004 [1919]: 7–8).
8. See also Heilbron (2004a: 30): “The distinctive characteristic of modern disciplines is precisely
to  organize  teaching,  research  and  professional  organization  within  the  same  kind  of
institutional unit”.
9. For  an  example,  cf.  the  failed  institutionalization  of  the  collective  of  US  sociologists  of
invention in the 1940s, Dubois (2014b).
10. “[I]t was felt that sociological study of the medical school would afford a prototype [italics
added, MD] for comparable studies in the other professions […] the other professions frequently
look to medicine as a model […]” (Merton 1957: 37); “[…] the profession of medicine […] has come
to be the prototype [italics added, MD] upon which occupations seeking a privilege status today
are modeling their aspirations (Freidson 1984 [1970]: xviii). It is also worth noting that in one of
the  first  seminars  on  professions  in  Columbia  University  in  1950,  eight  professions  were
represented:  medicine,  law,  architecture,  engineering,  social  work,  the ministry,  nursing and
education. 
11. Eliot Freidson’s book on the profession of medicine has a subtitle: A study of the sociology of
applied knowledge. 
12. This divide between occupation and profession has no real equivalent in French, see Champy
(2009). For a critical discussion of this divide, see Adams (2010).
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13. This prevalent cognitive dimension of the category of discipline was emphasized by Mary Joe
Nye:  “the  core  of  the  scientific  discipline  is  missed  if  the  discipline’s particular  values  and
characteristic problems are not noted and understood” (1993: 20).
ABSTRACTS
Although key categories in sociology since Max Weber, “profession” and “discipline” are often
used in a superficial manner, without any rigorous definitions. This article provides examples of
impressionistic approaches of those two notions by analyzing studies on the socialisation process
in  the  world  of  science.  Building  from  E.  Freidson  (1970  [1984]),  Y.  Gingras  (1991)  and  R.
Stichweh’s (1992) general line of arguments, I propose three main reasons to justify the need to
consider “discipline” and “profession” as two distinct phenomena that the sociologist should
study from the perspective of their interaction, but also of their transformation.
Bien que  les  catégories  de  « profession »  et  de  « discipline »  occupent  une place  centrale  en
sociologie  depuis  Max  Weber,  elles  sont  souvent  utilisées  de  façon  imprécise,  sans  être
rigoureusement définies. Cet article fournit des exemples d’approches impressionnistes de ces
notions en s’appuyant sur l’étude du processus de socialisation dans le monde scientifique. En se
fondant sur les travaux d’E. Freidson (1970 [1984]), de Y. Gingras (1991) et de R. Stichweh (1992),
j’avance  trois  raisons  principales  qui  justifient  le  besoin  de  considérer  « discipline »  et
« profession » comme deux entités distinctes que le sociologue devrait étudier du point de vue de
leurs interactions ainsi que de leur transformation.
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